The reality of terrorist and armed group threats in the Sahel tells a story way beyond the reach and influence of news headlines. Last year’s death toll paints a grim picture – extremist violence claimed more than 7,000 civilian lives in 2022. These numbers represent shattered communities and broken families across this vast African region from Senegal to Sudan. The area has turned into a breeding ground for violent extremism. Groups like Boko Haram, JNIM, and ISGS continue to expand their control over territory despite military efforts from the international community.
This piece digs deeper than security statistics and policy documents to reveal the human cost of this crisis. People living in conflict zones throughout Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger share stories that challenge official accounts. Their testimonies show how jihadist groups take advantage of weak governance and tensions between communities. The landscape has shifted dramatically with French troops pulling out and Russian mercenaries stepping in. Our complete analysis tracks the development of extremist threats in the Sahel from 2000 to 2025. We map how territories have changed hands, profile the core armed groups, and give voice to those who live through this ongoing catastrophe every day.
Timeline of Violent Extremism in the Sahel (2000–2025)
The rise of violent extremism in the Sahel dates back to the early 2000s. Islamist militant groups first gained ground in the big, ungoverned territories of northern Mali. The region has seen a dramatic change since then. The Sahel now accounts for 51% of global terrorism deaths—up from just 1% seventeen years ago.
Phase 1: AQIM and the Tuareg Rebellion (2003–2011)
Algeria’s civil war sparked today’s crisis. The conflict began in 1992 after the military canceled election results that favored an Islamist party. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) emerged from this conflict in 1998 as a breakaway faction of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
GSPC moved into northern Mali in 2003-2004, though they managed to keep rear bases in the area since 1998. The group built up substantial financial resources through kidnapping operations. Their most notable operation was the abduction of 32 European tourists in 2003. The group rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007 after pledging loyalty to al-Qaeda.
AQIM’s original strategy focused on giving money and small benefits to local communities. They acted as a “social security provider” where the state was absent. Libya’s civil war in 2011 made things worse by flooding northern Mali with weapons, which armed the Tuareg rebels.
Phase 2: Collapse of Northern Mali and Rise of Jihadist Coalitions (2012–2015)
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched an offensive against the Malian government on January 17, 2012. They wanted independence for northern Mali. President Amadou Toumani Touré lost power in a coup on March 21, 2012. Soldiers overthrew him because he failed to stop the rebellion.
State institutions fell apart, and the MNLA was quick to capture the regional capitals of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. They declared the independent state of Azawad by April. The alliance between MNLA and Islamist groups—AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine—broke down in June 2012.
Mali switched to civilian rule under Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in August 2013. His government signed a peace deal with Tuareg independence groups in 2015. Islamist organizations used this agreement to expand their control through central Mali and neighboring countries.
Phase 3: Expansion into Burkina Faso and Niger (2016–2020)
The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) emerged in Burkina Faso in 2016. This marked a crucial change as they launched their first major attack on a border post near Markoye in September. Several al-Qaeda affiliates combined to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) in 2017.
Violence grew dramatically in Burkina Faso:
- Terrorist attacks killed 80 people in 2016, rising to 1,800 in 2019
- The International Center for Counter-terrorism reported a 590% increase in terrorism-related deaths
- Human Rights Watch documented “execution-style” killings of village chiefs and local officials between 2016 and 2018
Violent incidents with Islamist militants doubled each year from 2015 to 2019. The focus of attacks moved eastward from Mali to Burkina Faso. The number of internally displaced people in Burkina Faso jumped from 40,000 in late 2018 to more than 500,000 by the end of 2019.
Phase 4: Southward Spread to Coastal West Africa (2021–2025)
The threat began moving south toward coastal West Africa by 2021. JNIM took control of northern and central Mali. ISGS stayed mostly in northern Burkina Faso and western Niger due to fights with JNIM that started in 2020.
The crisis grew beyond the Sahel’s usual boundaries. A senior military officer in Ivory Coast admitted “The army had previously underestimated the threat” as insurgents moved toward Atlantic coastal nations. The Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) saw its highest fatalities since it started in 2017 during 2023.
Violence reached new heights in 2024. Five of the ten countries most affected by terrorism were in the Sahel. The deadliest terrorist attack happened in Burkina Faso on June 11, 2024. JNIM gunmen killed at least 110 soldiers and 60 civilians.
The Alliance of Sahel States created an anti-jihadist Joint Force in 2024 to help. This force “contributes to stability and offers a context suitable to strengthening the state’s presence”. Mali also started a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process to demobilize 3,000 former combatants.
Territorial Expansion and Hotspots of Violence
Violent extremism in the Sahel thrives in specific geographical hotspots that serve as operational bases for jihadist groups. These groups control and expand their territory from these areas. Each hotspot shares common traits: minimal state presence, extreme poverty, and borders that let fighters and weapons move freely.
Liptako-Gourma Triangle: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
The Liptako-Gourma region—where Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger meet—has become the heart of violent conflict and terrorist activity in the Sahel. This area spans eight administrative regions of Burkina Faso, four regions of Mali, and two regions of Niger, including Niamey’s metropolitan area. Armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) now dominate this poverty-stricken region with its absent state institutions.
The death toll in this triangle paints a grim picture. The first six months of 2024 saw 3,064 civilian deaths. The conflict has forced millions to flee their homes:
- 3 million people have fled across the three countries
- 2 million people are internally displaced in Burkina Faso
- 450,000 people have been displaced in Mali
- 352,718 people are displaced in Niger
Military coups in Mali (2020-2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) made the security situation worse. The military juntas failed to improve security as promised. Violence increased in Mali and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso’s violence centered in three zones: Est, Center-Nord, and Nord regions.
Lake Chad Basin: Boko Haram and ISWAP Activity
The Lake Chad Basin, where Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria meet, stands as another major hub of extremist violence. Two Boko Haram splinter groups—Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—keep shifting power dynamics in this region.
JAS gained new strength in 2023 despite its leader Abubakar Shekau’s death in 2021. The group took most Lake Chad islands from ISWAP. JAS’s new leader Bakura Doro pushed ISWAP back and took control of two main areas: Lake Chad’s islands and the Mandara mountains.
These factions fight each other because they treat civilians differently. JAS targets all civilians for theft, while ISWAP separates Muslims from non-Muslims. ISWAP taxes Muslim communities and provides its version of law and order instead of just stealing. This approach has helped ISWAP replace the state in some areas and survive within communities it controls.
Former members say these groups lost more fighters fighting each other since 2021 than fighting state militaries. Yet they still command thousands of fighters and remain dangerous. In Borno state alone, 1.8 million civilians face Boko Haram violence since 2020.
Emerging Frontlines: Togo, Benin, and Ghana
Jihadist threats now reach toward coastal West African states. Benin saw attacks more than double, with 171 incidents in 2023 compared to 71 in 2022. Five park rangers died in northern Benin in July 2024, and seven people lost their lives in June. Togo suffered 14 attacks in 2023, killing 66 people.
Ghana hasn’t faced direct attacks yet but faces real threats. Jihadist groups operate just north of Ghana’s border in Burkina Faso, and fighters cross the border often. Ghana has sent over 1,000 elite special forces to guard its northern border.
These three coastal nations joined the Accra Initiative—a regional alliance created in 2017 to stop extremist spread. They share intelligence, run cross-border operations, and plan to create a 10,000-strong task force based in Ghana.
Extremist groups take root in these countries by exploiting local problems. JNIM and Islamic State groups have infiltrated Ghana’s illegal gold trade. They use disputes over livestock movement rules in Togo, while in Benin, they profit from conflicts between farmers and herders.
Profiles of Key Armed Groups in the Sahel
The Sahelian security scene is dominated by four major armed groups. Each group has unique origins, controls different territories, and uses distinct operational tactics. These organizations have evolved through mergers, splits, and ideological changes that have fundamentally altered regional stability.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
JNIM came into existence on March 2, 2017, through a merger of four Mali-based extremist groups: Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and the Sahara Emirate subgroup of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The group’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, immediately pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida’s global leadership, making JNIM the official branch of al-Qa’ida in Mali.
JNIM now controls large areas in northern and central Mali and has expanded its activities into Burkina Faso and Niger. The group maintains about 2,000 fighters in central and northern Mali. Its operations have seen dramatic success—2024 saw JNIM’s attacks in Niger intensify with 13 strikes causing 109 deaths, marking a 14-fold increase in fatalities. The group orchestrated nearly half of all attacks in Burkina Faso, where violence and casualties rose by over 50 percent.
JNIM’s tactical approach includes hit-and-run operations, kidnappings, IED attacks, and mortar strikes against security forces and civilian targets. The group executed Burkina Faso’s deadliest terrorist attack in June 2024, killing at least 110 soldiers and 60 civilians.
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)
ISGS began in May 2015 when Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The group operates as an independent subgroup of Islamic State West Africa Province, mainly in the Liptako-Gourma region across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
The group launched its first armed attack near Markoye, Burkina Faso, in September 2016. Islamic State’s central leadership formally accepted al-Sahrawi’s pledge in April 2019. Current estimates show ISGS has about 1,000 fighters who operate in mobile cells that combine for larger operations.
ISGS has a complex relationship with other jihadist groups. The group initially worked with JNIM despite global IS and al-Qaeda competition, even conducting joint operations like the August 2019 attack on Burkinabé forces in Koutougou. This alliance broke down into open conflict in summer 2019.
ISGS enforces strict sharia law in its territories, banning music and controlling social gatherings. While the group publicly amputates hands and feet of alleged thieves, it also provides governance services where states have failed, resolving land disputes and protecting cattle from theft.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
ISWAP emerged after Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to Islamic State in March 2015. Internal conflicts with Shekau’s leadership led Islamic State to appoint Abu Musab al-Barnawi in August 2016, splitting the movement. ISWAP now operates mainly in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin with approximately 5,000 fighters.
ISWAP takes a unique approach by distinguishing between Muslim and non-Muslim civilians under its control. The group targets non-Muslims but generally spares Muslim non-combatants, offering social services and governance. Local populations often view ISWAP as an alternative to absent state institutions.
The group generates funds through taxation, extortion, raids, and kidnap-for-ransom operations. ISWAP has conducted several high-profile attacks, including the June 2022 assault on a Catholic Church during mass in Owo, Nigeria, which killed at least 40 people.
Boko Haram Remnants and Splinter Factions
Boko Haram’s remnants, known officially as Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), continue operations under Bakura Doro’s leadership. JAS has shown remarkable resilience despite predictions of collapse after Shekau’s death in May 2021.
Doro’s leadership has helped JAS reclaim territory, particularly around Lake Chad where it captured most islands previously held by ISWAP in 2023. Unlike Shekau who sought media attention, Doro maintains a low profile while actively participating in operations.
JAS and ISWAP differ fundamentally in their treatment of civilians. JAS targets all civilians for plunder, while ISWAP treats Muslims differently by taxing rather than stealing from them. This difference has sparked ongoing conflicts between the factions. Former members report more fighter losses in these internal battles than in confrontations with state militaries.
Local Voices: Civilian Experiences in Conflict Zones
Image Source: Xchange
Human stories of suffering, adaptation, and resilience lie behind the statistics of Sahelian extremism. Millions of civilians caught in this expanding conflict face violent extremism not as an abstract threat but as their daily reality.
Displacement and Loss of Livelihoods
The Sahel region struggles with one of the world’s fastest growing displacement crises, yet few people know about it. The numbers tell a shocking story—almost 5 million people had to flee their homes across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and coastal countries by August 2024. This represents a 25% jump since 2020. Nearly 130,000 Malians ran to Mauritania just in the first half of 2024.
These displacements have crushed people’s ability to make a living because:
- Most displaced families rely on farming and herding to earn money, but they can’t continue these activities after leaving their land and cattle behind
- Host communities have very little land to share
- Some people risk their lives by traveling between their old villages and new settlements to tend their crops and cattle
Farming has taken a huge hit. Armed groups now restrict how far farmers can go, often keeping them away from the best farmland. Widespread cattle theft across the region has turned owning animals from a safety net into a liability.
Community Testimonies from Mopti and Tillabéri
Stories from conflict zones show the human face behind these numbers. A 45-year-old mother of six from Tillabéri described a brutal attack on her village and nearby Zaroumdareye on January 2, 2021. More than 100 people died, including 17 children. Her family ran to a displacement camp. “The money for food is so scarce, it’s not enough. At times we sleep with empty bellies,” she said.
Children’s education and mental health paint an even darker picture. A displaced 15-year-old boy said: “They don’t have our level here in the camp… At night, we would still practice our exercises [in the village]. But since being displaced, we don’t know where our old schoolbooks are”. A 13-year-old boy shared, “I have nightmares. I had a dream that the attackers killed all the children in the village, then I woke up”.
Mali’s Mopti region shows how conflicts grow from old problems over scarce natural resources, climate shocks, and clashing ways of life. These tensions give non-state armed groups the perfect opportunity to take control.
Civilian Perceptions of State and Non-State Actors
Local people often feel the government has left them behind. A 50-year-old man from a conflict-affected village put it simply: “we have been abandoned”. People in Torodi department back this up—they’ve seen how fewer military patrols let JNIM operate freely.
Ethnic Fulani people fear both security forces and armed groups equally. “If the FDS comes, they take us. If it’s the armed group, it’s the same,” said a 50-year-old man from Torodi. Sometimes when the military leaves its bases, extremist fighters attack right away, just like they did in Tiloa in January 2020.
Security forces have committed human rights violations that make everything worse. The Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) hasn’t just failed to protect people—they’ve committed violations that sometimes count as war crimes. People in the Liptako-Gourma region now live with constant fear, forced movement, and a deep sense that nobody will help them.
Case Study: Mauritania’s Counterterrorism Model
Mauritania has become a rare bright spot in the Sahel region, where violence continues to escalate. The country hasn’t seen a terrorist attack since 2011 – a remarkable achievement given how jihadist violence spreads through neighboring areas.
Intelligence-Led Operations and Religious Dialog
Mauritania’s strategy relies on strong intelligence networks that are deeply rooted in local communities. The security forces put prevention first by gathering information through human intelligence sources. This lets authorities stop terrorist plots early instead of just reacting to attacks.
The country also launched trailblazing religious dialog programs that connect jailed jihadists with moderate Islamic scholars. These conversations challenge extreme interpretations of Islam through theological debates based on Islamic jurisprudence. Many former militants have given up violence after these sessions, which shows how religious reasoning can fight radical ideologies.
Community Engagement and De-radicalization Programs
Mauritanian leaders knew military action alone wouldn’t work without tackling the mechanisms that drive extremism. They created community-focused approaches that target populations at risk of radicalization. These programs include:
- Economic development projects in neglected regions
- Educational reforms that teach moderate Islamic principles
- Support systems to help former extremists rejoin society
The country’s 12-year-old de-radicalization programs for detained extremists blend religious counseling with job training and psychological support. These initiatives help fighters develop civilian life skills and reduce the chance they’ll return to extremism after release.
Limitations in Replicating the Mauritanian Model
Despite its soaring wins, other Sahel countries don’t deal very well with copying Mauritania’s approach. Mauritania benefits from having fewer ethnic divisions than its neighbors, which makes community work easier. Countries like Mali and Burkina Faso face complex ethnic tensions that make fighting terrorism harder.
The country’s geography helps too – natural desert barriers help contain extremist movements. Most central Sahel nations lack these natural defenses and struggle with borders that militants cross easily.
Questions linger about how long Mauritania can maintain this approach. The country runs an authoritarian system with few civil liberties. This raises concerns that its counterterrorism success might come at the cost of human rights and democratic rule – a compromise other Sahelian nations may not want or be able to make.
Drivers of Radicalization and Recruitment
Image Source: IEMed
Religious ideology isn’t the only force behind extremist recruitment in the Sahel. Research shows that actual or perceived abuse by the state leads young people to join violent extremist groups.
Governance Vacuums and State Abuses
State fragility acts as both the cause and effect of violent jihadism in the Sahel. Jihadist groups naturally targeted the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger because central governments had long ignored these regions. These lawless environments became breeding grounds for armed bandits and militarized smuggling operations.
The military’s actions made things worse through systematic civilian abuse. Security forces in Burkina Faso executed 31 men at the time of April 2020 in Djibo. Niger’s forces reportedly executed or made 102 members of Tuareg and Fulani communities disappear in Inates and Ayorou. The UN documented 101 summary executions by Mali’s security forces that mainly targeted Fulani communities.
Ethnic Tensions and Intercommunal Conflicts
Jihadist groups have become skilled at using existing social divisions. They think over ways to stir up ethnic tensions and turn communities against each other. Their authority comes through persuasion or force. Local village chiefs face threats or assassination, which weakens traditional governance.
Self-defense groups with ethnic ties keep growing, like the Koglweogo in Burkina Faso, which raises the risk of more violence. These militias committed horrible acts, including killing between 49 and 210 Fulani people in Yirgou during January 2019.
Economic Marginalization and Youth Unemployment
Youth bulges – populations with too many young people – relate strongly to political violence risk. Africa has the world’s youngest population. About 90% of global youth (aged 15-29) live in developing countries. Around 41 million young people under 25 in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger face the risk of radicalization.
These young people see few economic opportunities ahead. High unemployment and political exclusion create perfect conditions for extremist ideas to spread. Radical movements likely emerge when a community faces multiple challenges – from social-political exclusion to corruption and mistreatment.
Regional and International Security Responses
Image Source: The Defense Post
The security scene in the Sahel has changed dramatically over the last several years. Western forces pulled out quickly while new military partnerships emerged. These changes created complex operational challenges that directly affected civilian populations in conflict zones.
G5 Sahel Joint Force and Multinational Task Forces
The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S), a 6-year old cooperative security initiative, brought together Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The force’s original budget reached €423 million for its first operational year. This budget was a big deal as it means that it surpassed the combined yearly military spending of all five member countries.
Mali’s withdrawal in May 2022 dealt major blows to FC-G5S, throwing the organization into an “institutional crisis”. This breakdown echoed other regional security initiatives. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) ended its operations in December 2023 after Mali’s government pulled its support.
New security structures have now taken shape. The Alliance of Sahelian States announced a 5,000-strong joint military force in January 2025. This force targets cross-border counterterrorism operations where extremist groups move between national boundaries.
Withdrawal of French Forces and Rise of Wagner Group
France pulled Operation Barkhane out of Mali in February 2022 after nine years. Russia quickly filled this security gap through the Wagner Group. This Russian private military company started sending personnel to Mali in December 2021.
The Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) offers what analysts call “regime survival packages.” These packages protect military governments instead of civilian populations. The number of civilian casualties has grown sharply since Wagner arrived, matching patterns of violence seen in other countries.
Challenges in Coordination and Trust Deficits
Military experts describe the growing number of armed groups as a “regional security traffic jam”. This fragmented setup shows separate security structures working toward different goals. These groups mostly coordinate informally rather than truly cooperating.
Military interventions have often damaged community relationships. Reports show security forces committing violations that help extremist groups recruit new members. These uncoordinated responses create a cycle. Harsh counterterrorism operations push civilians toward jihadist organizations that say they will protect them.
Humanitarian Fallout and Civilian Protection Gaps
The Sahel faces a growing humanitarian emergency that the world largely ignores. Violence from extremist groups continues to claim more lives. People living there suffer from widespread rights abuses. They struggle with failing social services and limited access to humanitarian aid.
Massacres, Arbitrary Arrests, and Human Rights Violations
Security forces in the Sahel have violated human rights under the excuse of fighting terrorism. Mali’s security forces killed 101 people without trial and made 32 people disappear in early 2020. Niger’s forces made similar moves – they made over 100 people vanish during Operation Almahou in Ayorou between March and April 2020.
The violence spreads beyond Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso’s security forces killed 31 men in Djibo in April 2020. The government’s Volunteers for the Defense of the Country militia killed 150 people in Karma village in April 2023. Every armed group targets civilians – state security forces caused 35% of human rights violations in Mali during 2022.
Effect on Education, Health, and Food Security
Long-term violence has destroyed social systems in the region. More than 6,000 schools have shut down or been destroyed. This leaves 7 million children without education. Attacks on schools and teachers forced over 4,000 schools to close in the Central Sahel between 2016 and 2020.
People can’t get enough food – 10.2 million people faced hunger across G5 Sahel countries from June to August 2023. About 900,000 people dealt with emergency situations. Burkina Faso’s situation looks grim – around 400,000 children under five likely suffered from acute malnutrition.
Barriers to Humanitarian Access in Conflict Zones
Aid organizations struggle to reach people who need help. Violence threatens aid workers directly – attacks on humanitarian groups have grown rapidly in Mali. Self-defense groups set up checkpoints that block aid delivery. Some even demand “taxes” from humanitarian convoys.
These obstacles leave about 1.5 million people in areas where they can’t access aid or basic services. Military restrictions on movement make things worse. Requirements for armed escorts undermine aid workers’ neutral status. People caught between armed groups and security forces face a protection crisis with no clear solution ahead.
The Sahel region faces one of the world’s worst yet unreported humanitarian disasters due to violent extremism. What started as isolated AQIM operations in northern Mali back in 2000 has grown into a regional catastrophe that claims thousands of lives each year across multiple countries. Armed groups continue their relentless push southward and threaten previously stable coastal nations. Four major groups—JNIM, ISGS, ISWAP, and JAS—now fight for control through increasingly complex attacks.
The conflict’s heaviest toll falls on civilians. Their stories paint a grim picture of mass displacement, destroyed livelihoods, and constant fear. Many families must choose between abandoning their ancestral lands or facing death from extremists or—equally troubling—the security forces meant to protect them. State abuse, ethnic tensions, and economic exclusion drive radicalization much more than religious ideology. This creates an endless cycle of violence.
Security responses don’t deal very well with these core issues. Regional dynamics shifted dramatically after French forces withdrew, the G5 Sahel Joint Force collapsed, and Russian mercenaries arrived. Yet civilian protection hasn’t improved. Mauritania’s approach to counterterrorism through intelligence-led operations and religious dialog shows promise, but its unique situation makes it hard to copy elsewhere. Aid organizations face growing obstacles as they try to help millions who need assistance desperately.
Violent extremism will without doubt keep spreading throughout West Africa if solutions don’t address both governance failures and security threats. Leaders must protect civilians, rebuild trust in state institutions, and create economic opportunities for at-risk populations. The Sahel crisis needs global attention not just as a counterterrorism challenge but as a devastating human tragedy that affects millions across an increasingly unstable region.